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In this paper, we examine the role of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights in its efforts to impose accountability for human rights violations in 
Latin America.  We suggest that because domestic enforcement 
mechanisms are irreconcilably deficient in this task, accountability must 
emanate from beyond the state.  We test this contention by examining one 
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Guatemalan security forces killed an estimated 200,000 people during that 
country‟s 30-year internal conflict.  Most of those responsible for these crimes remain 
hidden behind a stubborn wall of impunity.  In one episode, on July 18, 1982, 
Guatemalan military and para-military personnel slaughtered 268 civilians.  The 
massacre took place in Plan de Sanchez and surrounding communities where “soldiers 
randomly picked their victims, raping and torturing young women before rounding up 
villagers in a house, throwing in hand grenades and firing machines guns.”
1
  Most of the 
268 victims were Mayan.  For more than 20 years Guatemala blocked all attempts to 
punish those responsible for this massacre.   
As nations work to democratize and liberalize after periods of intense conflict, 
how can they confront this history of brutal human rights atrocities?  How can their 
recurrence be prevented?  While traditional Anglo-American democratic theory suggests 
that an independent judiciary is the institution ideally suited to hold the government 
accountable to the law, in this essay we will consider whether international courts are 
necessary to help post-conflict nations confront their past and democratize.  By looking at 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), we examine whether international 
courts can effectively promote human rights accountability and protection, and if so to 
what extent.  Human rights scholarship is perhaps at its most revealing when the analysis 
is coupled with the human story from which the legal and political issues arise.  
Therefore, our analysis will orbit around the case studies of the Mack, Carpio and Plan 
de Sanchez trials from Guatemala.
2
  Guatemala is an ideal subject of analysis for this 
essay because it is emerging from 30 years of political violence.  It has suffered some of 
 2 
the most horrific human rights violations in the region and it is now struggling to 
reconcile this past and embrace liberal democracy.  It has one of the worst human rights 
records in Latin America according to observers like Amnesty International and the U.S. 
State Department, and thus it is a monumentally challenging case.
3
   
To uncover answers to our questions we first provide a brief history of Guatemala.  
We then consider the role of courts in the struggle for human rights, demonstrating the 
need for international judicial action.  Accompanying this section, we include a 
discussion of the purpose of international courts.  Then after a brief introduction to the 
Inter-American human rights system and our three case studies, we examine whether and 
how the IACHR accomplishes the purpose of an international human rights tribunal.  
Finally, drawing on lessons from the analysis, we conclude that international courts, and 
specifically the Inter-American Court, can indeed promote human rights.  We base 
analysis on interviews with lawyers and activists working in the area, on our observation 




2. Historical Background 
Guatemala has a deeply tragic history of political violence and wide spread 
human rights violations with causes traceable to its colonial roots.  In an effort to break 
with years of the repression, stratification and exploitation of the colonial and post-
colonial regimes, Guatemala elected populists presidents in the two elections following 
World War II.  Dr. Juan José Arévalo and his successor Colonel Jacobo Arbenz Guzman 
embraced land reform and encouraged broader political participation.  However, in 1954, 
when President Arbenz‟s reform efforts were perceived as harming U.S. interests, the 
Central Intelligence Agency helped Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas overthrow Arbenz.  In 
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order to consolidate power and reverse the political opening of the Arévalo and Arbenz 
regimes, the Armas government strengthened the state security apparatus extending it to 
the rural areas.  For more than 40 years this security apparatus has been brutally 
repressing opposition in whatever form it appeared – supporters of land reform, the labor 
movement and the rural insurgency.  In 1978 when General Romeo Lucas Garcia became 
president he first targeted political opposition in the urban centers and later the labor 
movement and insurgency in the countryside.  Then after taking power in a coup in 1982 
General Efrain Rios Montt launched a bloody scorched earth anti-insurgency campaign.  
Most of the male peasants were conscripted into civil patrols and tens of thousands of 
innocent Guatemalans and combatants were killed.
5
 
In 1983 General Oscar Mejia Victores overthrew Rios Montt and began a 
painstakingly slow process of democratization.  However, this promising step did not 
coincide with the cessation of violence as the military continued its bloody anti-
insurgency campaign.  Despite a relatively successful democratic power transition in 
1986 the civilian governments were unable to wrest meaningful authority from the 
military.
6
   
Serrano Elias was elected president of Guatemala in 1990 defeating the National 
Center Party led by Jorge Carpio Nicolle.  However, Serrano‟s legislative coalition 
dissolved in 1993 causing him to lose control of his legislative agenda.  On May 25, 1993, 
Serrano executed a “self-coup” in which he dismissed congress, the Supreme Court, the 
Constitutional Court and the Procurator of Human Rights.  He suspended fundamental 
liberties and took control of radio and television broadcasting.
7
  On June 1, 1993, the 
Guatemalan Constitutional Court declared Serrano‟s administration illegal and Serrano 
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fled to El Salvador amidst rising opposition.  Five days later the Congress appointed the 
Procurator of Human Rights, Ramiro de Leon Carpio, Jorge Carpio Nicolle‟s cousin, 
President of Guatemala.
8
  Serrano‟s failed coup signaled the first albeit small step away 
from military dominance.  President Alvaro Arzú was elected president in 1996 and the 
Guatemalan Peace Accords were signed that year.   
Even with the Peace Accords and the transition to democratically elected civilian 
governments, Guatemalans continued to suffer brutal human rights violations.  For 
example, when the war ended in 1996, the Peace Accords required Guatemala to reform 
its justice system.  However, the United Nations agency established to monitor 
compliance with the peace accords (MINUGUA) reported continued impunity and the 
persistent lack of due process.  In its 2000 Special Report, MINUGUA concluded that 
“[w]ith regard to the allegations of threats, harassment and intimidation of judges, the 
Special Rapporteur finds that these concerns are real [and that t]he Government ha[s] 
failed to provide the requisite protection or assistance to those who have complained.”
9
  
In addition, “the large number of unsolved violent murders and the high incidence of 
impediments to investigations and prosecutions in these murders and human rights-
related crimes . . .  should give an indication of the very high rate of impunity.”
10
   The 
MINUGUA report in 2001 states that “[h]arassment and threats to justice operators 
continue to be of serious concern [and that] rather than declining, these incidents have 
actually increased.”
11
  This report finds that “impunity is still widespread.”
12
  In 2004, 
Óscar Berger was sworn in as Guatemala‟s latest president.  President Berger emphasized 
improving Guatemala‟s human rights protections as a central feature of his campaign.  As 
we discuss below, the Berger administration has taken some steps to fulfill that promise.  
 5 
However, there are still monumental obstacles to improving human rights conditions and 
to achieving justice for human rights violations.   
 
3. The Role of Courts 
 
A. Legal Accountability 
In the face of the legacy of catastrophic political violence, victims frequently look 
to the courts to reconstruct the rule of law and provide justice.  According to many 
human rights activists and scholars, courts must act to consolidate democratic reform 
based upon the rule of law in post-conflict or post-authoritarian settings.
13
  As Fletcher 
and Weinstein argue, “Accountability provides a direct, moral, and ethical response to 
victims on behalf of society that demonstrates that the state is validating their innocence 
and their lack of culpability in the deeds.”
14
   By punishing those responsible, the state 
recognizes the suffering of the victims and issues a moral condemnation of the actions 
committed.
15
  As Jamie Mayerfeld writes, punishment “communicates society‟s 
condemnation of [the] violation, and helps actual and potential aggressors to absorb the 
lesson that such violation is morally wrong.”
16
  Courts address the victims‟ desire for 
retribution by punishing individual defendants and in so doing may also serve to protect 
against future violations.
17
  Mayerfeld argues that, “the obligation to deter constitutes the 
core rationale for punishing human rights violations.”
18
  Yet another scholar, Jennifer 
Widner, points out that by punishing violators, courts can provide a credible threat that 
future violations will be punished as well.
19
  In order to guarantee human rights in the 
present, past threats to punish must be carried out.
20
   
Indeed, according to Mayerfeld, effective judicial dispute resolution systems 
“encourage social reconciliation by modeling a fair procedure for the just disposition of 
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violent conflicts fueled by bitter political and ideological divisions.”
21
   Judicial action 
against human rights violators may also prevent future abuses by reestablishing norms 
such as respect for the rule of law and basic human rights.
22
   Ruti Teitel states that 
“[w]hen criminal justice denounces these crimes, such prosecutions have a systemic 
impact transcending the implicated individual . . . [and to] society, such trials express the 
normative value of equality under the law, a threshold value in the transformation to 
liberal democratic systems.”
23
  Teitel also argues that “establishing knowledge of past 
actions committed under color of law and its public construction as wrongdoing is the 
necessary threshold to prospective normative uses of the criminal law.”
24
  Martha Minow 
agrees with this assertion as she writes, “To respond to mass atrocity with legal 
prosecutions is to embrace the rule of law.”
25
  Human rights trials, according to Minow, 
transform individual desires for vengeance to the state and this “transfer cools vengeance 
into retribution, slows judgment with procedure and interrupts, with documents, cross-




B. Judicial Independence and Accountability 
 Scholars and activists frequently urge judicial independence and reform in order 
to establish a domestic institution capable of holding government accountable to the rule 
of law.
27
  The result, in theory, is an independent court system at home that can check 
tyranny from the other political institutions.  Judicial independence can be defined as the 
extent to which the members of a court may adjudicate free from institutional controls, 
incentives, and impediments imposed by other political institutions or forces.
28
  In 
Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton states that “the courts were designed to be an 
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intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order to, among other things, 
to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority.”
29
  According to Hamilton, 
the independence of the judiciary operates as a "safeguard against the effects of 
occasional ill humors in the society.”
30
  As Charles Epp states in his comparative study, 
“the judicial system‟s structural independence . . . is widely recognized as a necessary 
condition for any significant judicial check on arbitrary power.”
31
  
 Independence would seem to be especially important if courts are to hold 
government officials accountable for past or on-going violations of human rights.  In a 
comparison of the U.S. and Canadian high courts, Miller discovered the U.S. Supreme 
Court was more likely to challenge other branches because it possessed more autonomy 
than its Canadian counterpart.
32
  Comparative scholars have consistently recognized the 
importance of judicial independence in democratization, protecting individual rights and 
promoting the rule of law.
33
  Dodson and Jackson linked the impotence of the judiciary 
directly to human rights violations in Guatemala and El Salvador.
34
 
Thomas Jefferson differed with Hamilton‟s view of judicial independence, 
however, arguing that judges “should be submitted to some practical and impartial 
control.”
35
  He observed that “[a]ll know the influence of interest on the mind of man, 
and how unconsciously his judgment is warped by that influence.”
36
  Critics of absolute 
judicial autonomy “object to what they consider to be an inordinate and constitutionally 
unjustifiable grant of power to the branch of government which is least likely to 
accurately represent the genuine will of the people.”
37
  For example, Mark Tushnet 
argues that granting judges independence encourages them to follow their political will 
and not necessarily their legal judgment.
38
  Michael Collins points out that an 
 8 




It is possible, then, that the traditional pillars of judicial independence could, in 
some circumstances, impede human rights accountability.  Ratner and Abrams argue that, 
“Accountability cannot be isolated from the political dynamic in which competing 
factions within states seek to manipulate the past in order to justify both their prior 
activities and the current programs.”
40
  In repressive states, judges abetting tyranny could 
continue to do so unencumbered by the constraints of democratic accountability.  
Independence can only free courts from unwanted influence, it cannot grant judges the 
will to confront decades of impunity, nor can it anoint them with the wisdom to overcome 
legislatively or constitutionally rooted opposition to accountability.   Judges will, after all, 
always be bound to the political elite at least to some degree and as Ratner and Abrams 
articulate, “the most critical reason for the lack of prosecutions…is that serious violations 
of international human rights or humanitarian law are usually committed on behalf of or 
with the complicity of the state.”
41
  In addition to judicial ties to state actors, the barriers 
maintaining impunity include doctrines of sovereign immunity and amnesty laws, both of 
which are raised and maintained by the state.    
In new and unstable democracies the prosecution of human rights cases can 
actually destabilize the democratic government and harm the cause of accountability.  
Ratner and Abrams point out that “if a nation‟s leaders allow the prosecutions to become 
a pawn in the competition for power, the trials will lack credibility and damage the 
foundations of democracy.”
42
  These authors cite the Argentine experience, in which the 
prosecution of human rights cases motivated the military “to challenge the young and 
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insecure civilian government, thereby putting an end to the prosecutorial process.”  
Similar dangers exist in Guatemala.  On the other hand Ratner and Abrams recognize that 
“outside actors – states, international organizations, and NGOs – can often help 




To summarize, judicial independence allows courts to provide some measure of 
accountability for human rights violations.  However, because domestic courts are part of 
the state, they are constrained by state-constructed barriers.  The level of accountability 
they can provide, therefore, is severely limited.  To overcome these barriers and to reach 
greater levels of accountability victims must reach beyond the state.  As I will 
demonstrate further below, doing so not only affords victims with a forum beyond state 
control, it can strengthen the independence of local judicial processes.     
 
C. Deep Wounds and Shallow Justice – Domestic Prosecutions in the Carpio, 
Plan de Sanchez and Mack Cases 
 
There is support for these assertions from the trenches of human rights litigation 
in Guatemala.  In the spring of 1993, politician, reform activist and newspaper-owner 
Jorge Carpio Nicolle opposed the Serrano self-coup and the subsequent proposals to grant 
amnesty to those who orchestrated the coup.  Within a month of this outspoken 
opposition, a state-sponsored civil patrol intercepted and murdered Carpio and several of 
his associates.
44
  The families sought justice for the killings in Guatemala but Judge after 
judge refused to hear the case.  Guatemalan trial and appellate courts twisted the law to 
block all efforts to hold accountable those responsible for the killings.
45
  Throughout the 
more than ten years of investigation numerous crucial pieces of evidence have been lost, 
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mislabeled and otherwise destroyed.
46
  Despite a report prepared by a chief prosecutor 
implicating 11 members of a civil defense patrol in the murders only four of these men 
were tried and only one was convicted of the crime.  Moreover, this conviction came in 
1996 after three years of dilatory tactics by the defense and by the trial courts.  In an 
additional blow, the trial court refused to consider the role of the civil defense patrol and 
foreclosed any investigation of the intellectual authors of the attack.  Then in 1998, in a 
shocking ruling, the Guatemalan Court of Appeals absolved Patzan of any responsibility 
for the murder and ordered his immediate release.  The Court cited numerous evidentiary 
irregularities, including the broken chain of custody of the alleged murder weapon.  The 
Guatemalan Supreme Court upheld this result and, while the investigation remains open, 
no notable progress has occurred since that time.
47
   
The result was an utter destruction of any belief in justice emanating from the 
democratizing state.  As the wife of one of the victims, Silvia Villacorta, testified before 
the Inter-American Court, “Guatemala is a country of deep wounds and shallow justice”
48
  
The wife of Jorge Carpio, Mrs. Arrivillaga de Carpio, recounted the utter failure of the 
justice system in Guatemala and told the Inter-American Court that, as a result, she lived 
each day in fear.
49
  “I felt unprotected,” she testified.
50
   
The state obstructed all efforts to pursue truth and justice in the Plan de Sanchez 
massacre case as well.  During the period in which the massacre occurred, the military 
was terrorizing the Mayan peasant countryside as part of its scorched earth 
counterinsurgency campaign.  These onslaughts came in the form of murders, violent 
intimidation, displacement and the destruction of houses, farms, and livestock.  Thus, in 
the decade that followed the 1982 massacre the state was almost completely successful in 
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blocking attempts to investigate those responsible.  One of the victims, Juan Manual 
Jeronimo, testified, “The first years after the massacre we didn‟t do anything to seek 
justice because we were not even allowed to talk about what happened never mind what 
we wanted to do.”
51
  Finally, in 1993 victims represented by the Center for Human Rights 
Legal Action (CALDH) brought charges.  After exhumations and an investigation began 
in 1994 the process quickly ran into state erected road blocks.  Evidence, such as 
ammunition cartridges and ballistics reports disappeared and exhumations slowed to a 
stop.  As one of the victims, Buenaventura Manuel Jerónimo, testified before the Inter-
American Court:  
After a long time, a report of the incident was filed by the Center for Human 
Rights Legal Action [In Guatemala].  Nevertheless, until today there has been 
neither justice nor any results of that process.  The violence, the corruption, and 
the discrimination against the indigenous peoples and farmers impede justice.  
Until this day there are still threats against any judge involved in the case.”
52
  
On September 11, 1990, Myna Mack Chang, an anthropologist studying the 
displacement of thousands of indigenous Guatemalans, was assassinated by members of a 
military death squad.  Authorities originally informed Myrna Mack‟s sister, Helen, that 
Myrna perished in an auto accident.  Skeptical of the claim, Helen eventually discovered 
the true cause of her sister‟s death – she had been stabbed 27 times outside her Guatemala 
City office.  For Helen Mack, the path to justice has been an insufferable ordeal.  The 
state actively blocked her efforts to hold those responsible for the murder accountable 
under Guatemalan law.  As in the Carpio and Plan de Sanchez cases the mechanisms of 
impunity were first deployed during the initial investigation.  Investigators neglected to 
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take fingerprints, photographs or blood samples from the crime scene.  Although Myrna 
Mack‟s clothing and fingernail samples were initially retained, they were discarded 
before any laboratory analysis was conducted on them.  A report drafted by investigators 
suggesting that Guatemalan security forces planned and carried out the murder was 
destroyed.  When one of these investigators testified about this report he was 
assassinated.
53
   
In addition to legal and procedural obstructions those wishing to preserve 
impunity launched a violent campaign against anyone working on the Mack case.  In 
April 1994 the president of Guatemala‟s Constitutional Court, Epaminondas González 
Dubón, was shot and killed.  At the time of the murder the Court was considering several 
controversial human rights cases, including preliminary rulings on the Myrna Mack 
case.
54
  Throughout the more than 10 years of judicial proceedings death threats have 
driven more than ten judges to drop the case.  Several judges, prosecutors and witnesses 
have fled the country after receiving death threats.  In July 1994, Helen Mack was forced 
to leave Guatemala after a plan to murder her was exposed.  The next month Roberto 
Romero, a Myrna Mack Foundation lawyer, fled the country after assailants fired at 
him.
55
   In an interview, an activist working in Guatemala reported that she has personal 
knowledge of judges and prosecutors who suffer “harassment, threats . . . in a lot of cases 
their families have been threatened, they‟re harassed, some of them have suffered attacks 




D. The Need for International Court Involvement 
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Both Governmental agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
monitoring the judiciary in Guatemala during and after the war have unanimously found 
that Guatemala‟s courts not only failed to offer citizens adequate judicial remedies, but 
actually aided human rights violations and perpetrated impunity.  For example, The 
Historical Clarification Commission for Guatemala concluded: “The justice system, non-
existent in large areas of the country before the armed confrontation, was further 
weakened when the judicial branch submitted to the requirements of the dominant 
national security model.”  The Historical Clarification Commission went even further 
finding that:  
. . . by tolerating or participating directly in impunity, which concealed the 
most fundamental violations of human rights, the judiciary became 
functionally inoperative with respect to its role of protecting the individual 
from the State, and lost all credibility as guarantor of an effective legal 
system. This allowed impunity to become one of the most important 
mechanisms for generating and maintaining a climate of terror.
57
 
Even after the Peace Accords were signed in 1996 justice was simply not 
available to human rights victims. Few cases were prosecuted and the intimidation of 
complainants, judges, prosecutors, and witnesses obstructed the judicial process.  With 
the Mack, Carpio and Plan de Sanchez cases we see a fundamental justification for 
international courts.  When a domestic system so completely fails in its duty to uphold 
the rule of law, it is incumbent on the international system to fill the void.  According to 
Teitel, international human rights “jurisprudence evinces the clear delimiting of state 
power on the basis of individual rights norms.”
58
  Extra-national rulings against former 
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officials shatter the view that these officials are immune from prosecution and inspire 
local attempts to penetrate the shield of impunity.  Prosecutions in international courts, 
therefore, can send a powerful message to the legal and human rights communities in 
post-conflict nations.  Ratner and Abrams point out that international courts can “put 
pressure on governments comply with their international obligations (including their 
duties to prosecute offenders.”
59
  They also recognize that these institutions can 
“establish an authoritative factual record” and “serve the cause of developing human 
rights and humanitarian law.”
60
  Minow argues that when a crime against humanity is 
“prosecuted outside the affected territory, in the absence of regime change, it is perhaps 
the purest illustration of the potential of law to effect normative transition . . . [i]ndeed, 
the very response to the crime against humanity instantiates its core value of transcendent 
justice.”
61
  Extra-national convictions can aid local prosecutions by communicating legal 
strategies and even precedent through the embracing of a broad concept of international 
law.  As Minow observes “[e]specially when framed in terms of universality, the 
language of rights and the vision of trials following their violation equip people to call for 
accountability even where it is not achievable.”
62
   
 
4. Cases Before the IACHR 
 
 A. Introduction to the Inter-American System 
 
The Organization of American States (OAS) established the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (Commission) in 1959 to monitor compliance with the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.  Then in 1965 the OAS gave the 
Commission the power to hear individual human rights cases and recommend solutions.  
 15 
In 1969 the OAS recast its human rights principles by passing the American Convention 
on Human Rights. The Convention not only sets out the basic human rights standards for 
member states but it establishes the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR). Of 
the 35 OAS member nations 24 have accepted the binding jurisdiction of the IACHR.
63
  
Guatemala signed the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights on May 25, 1978, 
and accepted the jurisdiction of the Court on March 9, 1987. 
Under the Convention the primary functions of the Commission are to consider 
individual complaints and impose conciliatory remedies, to monitor human rights 
compliance in the region, to conduct on site studies of human rights conditions and to 
impose “precautionary measures” to prevent potential human rights violations.  The 
Commission has frequently involved itself in Guatemala‟s human rights affairs.  For 
example after an on site visit in 2001, the Commission concluded that: 
 . . . profound systemic deficiencies continue to subvert justice, and have 
yet to be effectively addressed.  These include serious problems in the 
systems and procedures for delivering justice, as well as the paralyzing 
effect of attempts to coerce those involved in the pursuit and 
administration of justice through threats and corruption.  Given the central 
role of the judiciary in safeguarding all individual rights, the challenge of 
redressing these problems is both urgent and paramount. 
64
 
To pursue a human rights claim in the Inter-American system victims must first 
file a complaint with the Commission.  The Commission then seeks a response from the 
nation alleged to have committed the violation.  Once a response is received the 
Commission must decide if the case is admissible – meaning within the Commission‟s 
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jurisdiction.  For the petition to be admissible it must allege violations of rights protected 
by one of the several instruments recognized by the OAS and it must demonstrate that the 
petitioners exhausted their domestic remedies.
65
  The Commission can hear complaints 
against any member nation of the OAS.
66
   
If the Commission determines a case is admissible it considers evidence presented 
by each of the parties and frequently encourages a negotiated settlement.  If negotiations 
fail the Commission issues a ruling on culpability.  If it finds the nation culpable, it issues 
recommendations and prescribes remedies.  These rulings are confidential at this stage 
and designed to encourage violating nations to comply with the mandated human rights 
instruments.  If a nation fails to comply with the orders of the Commission, the 
Commission brings the case before the IACHR.  Here the Commission prosecutes the 
case against the nation in question.  Evidence is presented and a formal decision is issued 
by the court that contains a ruling on culpability as well as remedies if appropriate.  The 
victims may be represented by counsel before the Commission and IACHR.   
 
B. The Carpio Case 
With all efforts to pursue justice at home blocked, Carpio‟s wife, Martha 
Arrivillaga de Carpio, and daughter-in-law, Karen Fischer, looked beyond Guatemala to 
the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights.  With the help of the Human Rights 
Office of the Archbishop of Guatemala, the Center for Justice and International Law 
(CEJIL), Human Rights Watch and the International Human Rights Law Group, these 
women filed a petition with the Commission on July 12, 1994.  Instead of pleading that 
they had exhausted local remedies the Carpio petitioners argued that the state actively 
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obstructed their attempts to seek justice domestically and that domestic remedies were 
therefore unobtainable.
67
  The Commission agreed that justice in Guatemala had been 
completely obstructed by the state. 
The Commission typically makes the decision on admissibility at the outset – as it 
did in the Plan de Sanchez case discussed below.  However, if more information is 
needed to make the determination – as it was in the Carpio case – the Commission can 
reserve this decision until it has heard from the parties and considered the facts.  At this 
early stage the Commission sets out to find a conciliatory solution by receiving evidence 
and negotiating with the parties.  After doing so in the Carpio case, the Commission 
finally ruled that the case was admissible.  It then ordered Guatemala to investigate the 
murders thoroughly in order punish those responsible for planning and carrying out the 
attack.
68
  The Commission‟s order also included provisions recommending reparations 
for the families of the victims.
69
  On June 10, 2003, when Guatemala failed to reply 
within the time required, the Commission took the case to the Inter-American Court.
70
   It 
alleged that Guatemala violated the victims‟ rights to life, personal integrity, judicial 
protection, freedom of expression, and the rights of the child under the Inter-American 
Convention.  While the Commission prosecuted cases, recent changes in the IACHR‟s 
rules allow the victims and survivors to be represented by counsel at the proceedings as 
well.  CEJIL represented the Carpio parties.
71
   
As the Carpio hearing began on July 5 and 6, 2004, the president of the 
Guatemalan Presidential Commission of Human Rights announced that his government 
accepted Guatemala‟s international responsibility for the attack on Carpio and his 
associates.
72
  Guatemala acknowledged that Mr. Carpio was murdered to chill opposition 
 18 
to the amnesty provisions.  Because the state accepted responsibility, neither the 
Commission nor CEJIL were required to prove the elements of each of the alleged 
violations.  However, CEJIL stressed the importance of allowing the victims and families 
to tell their stories in open court and the state voiced no opposition to allowing them to do 
so.
73
    
The Court ruled that the state, acting through para-militaries, murdered Carpio for 
political reasons and that it erected obstructions to justice resulting in “total impunity.”
74
  
It went beyond a simple judgment that Carpio‟s rights were violated, and ruled that the 
rights of all those threatened and attacked in their pursuit of justice in the case were also 
violated.
75
  The reparations assigned by the Court in both cases reflect a desire to extend 
beyond compensation and take steps to remedy conditions in Guatemala.  For example, in 
addition to money damages totaling $1,360,000 for the victims‟ families, the Court 
ordered the state to enact concrete measures to prevent similar violations and continued 
impunity.
76
   
 
C. The Plan de Sanchez Case 
 
Blocked by the same infrastructure of impunity in Guatemala, the victims of the 
Plan de Sanchez massacre filed their claim with the Inter-American Commission on May 
11, 1999.  As in the Carpio case, the petitioners argued and the Commission agreed that 
local remedies were unobtainable due to the wall of impunity erected by the state.  
CALDH represented the victims and families before the Commission and before the 
IACHR.   
In August, 2000, President Alfonso Portillo admitted “institutional responsibility” 
for the Plan de Sanchez massacre during conciliation discussions between the state, the 
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petitioners, and the Commission.
77
  On February 28, 2002, the Commission, after 
analyzing the positions of both sides, made a series of recommendations to the state 
including a demand that the state conduct an investigation to identify and sanction those 
responsible for the massacre.
78
  The Commission also required Guatemala to pay both 
material and nonmaterial compensation to the survivors of the massacre and to take 
measures to ensure that such an atrocity would never recur.  Despite Portillo‟s acceptance 
of responsibility, Guatemala failed to take the steps required by the Commission.
79
  
Therefore, the Commission presented the case before the IACHR on July 31, 
2002.  At this stage Commission lawyers took on new roles and prosecuted the case 
against the state before the Inter-American Court.  They alleged that the state of 
Guatemala violated the rights to personal integrity, judicial protection, judicial guarantees, 
equality before the law, property and freedom of religion embodied in Articles 5, 8, 25, 
24, 12, 21, and 1.1 of the American Convention of Human Rights.
80
  In addition to 
prosecuting the rights of those killed and wounded during the attacks and the rights of 
those who suffered losses, the Commission alleged violations based on Guatemala‟s 
resistance to truth and justice in the case.   
The Plan de Sanchez hearing took place before the IACHR in San Jose, Costa 
Rica, on April 23 and 24, 2004. In addition to depositions and affidavits, the Commission 
and CALDH called family members of those killed in the massacre and experts on the 
effects of the attack.  After the Commission concluded its case, Guatemala announced 
that it was retracting its exceptions to the complaint and accepting full international 
responsibility for the massacre and subsequent violations.
81
  Doing so constituted 
complete acceptance of the Commission‟s complaint and an admission that Guatemala 
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committed the violations therein alleged.  The Court accepted Guatemala‟s admissions 
and shifted the proceeding to the reparations phase.
82
 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that the Plan de Sanchez 
victims were denied their rights to personal integrity, judicial protection, equality before 
the law, freedom of religion, property.
83
  Moreover the state‟s efforts to preserve 
impunity after the massacre violated the petitioners‟ rights to judicial protection.
84
  The 
Court awarded $20,000 per beneficiary in pecuniary damages totaling almost $7 
million.
85
  Moreover the Court ordered Guatemala to construct health care and mental 





 C. The Myrna Mack Case 
Immediately after Myrna Mack‟s murder Helen Mack approached the Inter-
American Commission.  On Helen‟s behalf the Guatemalan Human Rights Commission 
filed a complaint against Guatemala in the Commission on September 12, 1990.  The 
Commission reserved its determination of admissibility while it observed the domestic 
process.  However, on March 5, 1996, after seeing the ineffectiveness of the domestic 
proceedings, the Commission ruled that the Mack case was admissible.  At a hearing 
before the Commission the state accepted institutional responsibility for the extra-judicial 
killing of Myrna Mack.  This step facilitated a compromise agreement on the remedies to 
be prescribed.  In this agreement, Guatemala promised to reinitiate the domestic case 
against the alleged intellectual authors of the killing and to protect the integrity of those 
proceedings.
87
   
 21 
The Inter-American Commission sent a delegation to Guatemala to ensure the 
state complied with the agreement and in two separate reports the delegation found that 
Guatemala failed to do so.  In light of these findings, on March 8, 2001, the Commission 
issued a decision finding Guatemala responsible for violating Myrna Mack‟s right to life, 
and Helen Mack‟s right to justice.  It assessed damages and required Guatemala to 
investigate and prosecute those responsible for orchestrating the murder.  In response 
Guatemala revoked its admission of institutional responsibility.  The Commission ruled 
that Guatemala showed no indication that it would follow the Commission‟s 
recommendations and filed the case in the IACHR on July 26, 2001.  Guatemala objected, 
arguing that neither the Commission nor the Court had jurisdiction because the domestic 
prosecution was ongoing.  The IACHR agreed with the Commission‟s ruling that the 
domestic prosecution was a façade disrupted by obstructions orchestrated by the state.
88
   
The IACHR heard the Mack case from February 18 – 20, 2003.  CEJIL 
represented the victims and along with the Commission they put on evidence of the 
state‟s responsibility for the murder, the repeated state efforts to obstruct the domestic 
proceedings and the tremendous toll Myrna Mack‟s death had upon the lives of her 
family members.  Myrna Mack‟s daughter, who was 16 years old when her mother was 
killed, testified that she “thinks of her mother every day, especially of the way she was 
murdered, of the pain of the 27 knife wounds she suffered, and of how she must have felt 
lying alone on the street.”
89
   
On November 25, 2003, the Court issued its judgment in which it ruled that the 
Presidential General Staff had ordered Guatemalan security forces to murder Myrna 




  The IACHR ruled that the murder was planned and executed for political 
purposes as part of campaign to silence those who would expose Guatemalan human 
rights violations.
91
  The Court also found that Guatemala had denied the Mack family the 
right to justice by covering up the crime and obstructing the judicial process through legal 
and violent means.
92
  Finally, the Court ruled that Guatemala violated the Mack family‟s 
rights to humane treatment by committing the murder and by using threats and coercion 
to impede the family‟s attempts to pursue justice.
93
  In addition to more than $600,000 in 
pecuniary damages divide among three family members, the Court required Guatemala to 
remove all obstacles to the domestic prosecution, to name a street after Myrna Mack and 
to create a permanent anthropology scholarship in Myrna Mack‟s name. 
These three cases present a typical formula for Guatemala.  In each the state 
orchestrated a brutal human rights violation.  In each the state deployed a multifaceted 
campaign to cover up the crime and obstruct all efforts to attain justice.  And in each the 
litigants reached beyond the state, to the Inter-American Court, to escape the Guatemalan 
formula of injustice. 
 
4. The IACHR and Human Rights Accountability 
 
 A. The Function of the IACHR 
 In their study of international courts, Posner and Yoo argue that the IACHR is 
ineffective because it hears few cases and compliance rates are low.
94
  In their effort to 
compare a wide variety of international courts, these authors necessarily simplify their 
criteria for effectiveness by concentrating on the number of cases heard and the rate of 
compliance.  This assessment may not fully reflect the effectiveness of an institution like 
the IACHR.  For example, when comparing the IACHR to the European Court of Human 
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Rights (ECHR), Posner and Yoo find the IACHR to be less effective.  However, these 
institutions are in completely different political universes, serving radically different 
purposes.  The ECHR is the pinnacle tribunal created and supported by predominantly 
established democracies.  While it considers cases from transitional democracies, some of 
which are dealing with political violence, most of its rulings address nonviolent 
violations.  The ECHR, and European courts in general, have comparatively high levels 
of legitimacy.
95
  Importantly, the European Union provides significant material incentives 
to submit to and comply with the authority of the ECHR.  In this environment the goal of 
the ECHR is to constrain member states under the conventions – member states which for 
the most part have established records of compliance with the rule of law.  On the other 
hand, the IACHR is an institution striving to solidify its institutional legitimacy in a sea 
of new and developing democracies.  Many of these democracies are experiencing or 
emerging from drastic political violence.  The cases before the IACHR often arise from 
the political violence that preceded democratization or that is part of the transition 
struggle.  The purpose and setting of the IACHR is fundamentally different, therefore, 
than that of the ECHR.   
In this piece we focus our assessment on whether the IACHR improves human 
rights conditions in the Americas, concentrating on one of the toughest challenges - 
Guatemala.  Drawing from the scholarship discussed above we identify four purposes of 
an international court that hears human rights cases from post-conflict democracies.  (See 
Table 1).  First, it should operate to deter future violations with rulings that “equip people 
to call for accountability.”
96
  Second, it should facilitate the legal and moral 
condemnation of human rights violations.
97
  Third, its jurisprudence should transcend the 
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parties in the case in order to express the normative value of justice and equality under 
the law to broad classes of victims.
98
  Fourth, it should establish “knowledge of past 
actions committed under color of law” and create a historical record.
99
  An overview of 
the IACHR‟s jurisprudence demonstrates that, given the tribunal‟s authority and 
resources, it has had some success.  
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
B. Facilitating Accountability – Equipping Victims to Seek Justice 
There are numerous examples of the IACHR overriding state efforts to erect 
institutional barriers to human rights accountability.  In 2001, the IACHR ruled that 
Peruvian amnesty laws protecting military personnel from prosecution for a 1991 
massacre violated the American Convention on Human Rights.
100
  After this decision the 
Peruvian government filed charges against security forces allegedly responsible for this 
and other human rights crimes.
101
  In 1999, the IACHR ruled that El Salvador was 
responsible for the 1989 murder of six Jesuit priests and two others.  In doing so, the 
Court struck down El Salvador‟s amnesty law, holding that the state had unlawfully 
denied citizens‟ the right to justice by granting amnesty to those convicted for the 
murder.
102
  Pursuant to IACHR decisions, Chilean courts ruled that a 1978 amnesty law 
could not supersede international law.  Because Chile had signed the Inter-American 
treaties prohibiting torture and other human rights violations, the amnesty law as applied 
to these crimes violated Chile‟s international obligations.
103
  By circumventing these 
barriers to accountability, the IACHR equips litigants with the legal tools to pursue 
justice domestically.  These rulings poke holes in the wall of impunity erected by the 
state. 
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The most illustrative example of this phenomenon in Guatemala may be the 
Myrna Mack case – as the IACHR revived the case on at least two occasions.  After 
Myrna Mack was killed by security forces, prosecutors and the Myrna Mack Foundation 
tried for more than ten years to convict the intellectual authors of the attack.  Guatemala 
had an interest in keeping the domestic case going in order to argue that domestic 
remedies had not been exhausted and that the Commission case was inadmissible.  Then 
in March, 2000, faced with an imminent IACHR trial, the government offered to take 
responsibility for the murder.  The stalled domestic trial of the senior officers accused in 
the case suddenly resumed and, armed with IACHR rulings, prosecutors won guilty 
verdicts against two officers who planned the murder.  In another set-back, however, 
these verdicts were overturned on appeal.  Once again the IACHR stepped in.  In 
December, 2003, the IACHR unanimously ruled that Guatemala had violated the right to 
life and the right to judicial guarantees and protection. The tribunal ordered Guatemala to, 
among other things, “remove all obstacles to justice in the case.”
104
  Just one month later 
the Guatemalan Supreme Court reinstated the guilty verdicts against the officers who 
orchestrated Myna Mack‟s murder.   
It is clear from the Guatemala cases that the IACHR sees its role as a mechanism 
to circumvent the systemic impunity in oppressive nations.  Throughout the Carpio trial 
IACHR judges asked witnesses and counsel what the Court could order to remedy 
impunity, to push human rights cases through the Guatemalan courts and to prevent 
future judicial stonewalling.
105
  For example, Judge Garcia Sayan asked several witnesses 
“what ingredients might be necessary to conduct an effective investigation” in the Carpio 
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case and in similar cases.  Judge Jackman asked the lawyers in the case, “What formal 
steps are needed to reopen the [Carpio] case on Guatemala?”
106
   
Another way the IACHR helps advocates seek accountability is through the 
publicity accompanying international cases.  Human rights NGOs use the Inter-American 
process to call attention to the mechanisms fostering impunity domestically.  The 
Washington Office for Latin America (WOLA) worked with the lawyers in the Mack 
case to conduct a public relations campaign so that the case would have a significant 
impact in Guatemala and globally.  As Adrianna Beltran, the head of this campaign, 
stated in an interview, “we used the Mack case as a way of highlighting the inefficiencies 
of the judicial system.”
107
  The purpose of the media campaign, according to Ms. Beltran, 
was to “illustrat[e] the impunity that the military enjoyed, the weaknesses and the failures 
of the judicial system, the human rights situation and the fact that so many witnesses, 
lawyers, judges were being threatened, harassed, murdered.”
108
  Based on the IACHR 
case, this group orchestrated a campaign to use the case to bring pressure to bear on 
Guatemala from members of the U.S. government.  Ms. Beltran recalled that: “if the 
[domestic] case was stalling – or if security was necessary – we would organize a 
campaign involving „dear colleague‟ letters or remarks on the floor, [we] would then 
circulate it to U.S. and International media.”
109
   
 As Pasqualucci (2003) observes, the Inter-American Court has liberally settled 
several controversial questions of international human rights law thereby giving 
advocates legal tools in their campaign for accountability.
110
  For example, the Court 
rejects the contention that rights are “culturally relative” and instead holds them to be 
universal.
111
  The IACHR fundamentally altered rights jurisprudence in the region when 
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it held that human rights law was part of international law but that unlike traditional 
international law, it did not merely grant rights to states.
112
  Moreover, early in its history, 
the IACHR held that international law obligated states and granted to individuals the 
authority to hold states to compliance.
113
  In doing so, the Court struck down state efforts 
to circumvent this obligation.  According to Pasqualucci, the Court allowed fundamental 
human rights to develop and expand over time.  Instead of interpreting rights as they 
existed when the Court was established, it considered rights within the legal framework at 
the time of interpretation.
114
  Another crucial element of the Court‟s jurisprudence, 
according to Pasqualucci, is that it has held that certain fundamental human rights are 
non-derogable, even in times of emergency.  The Court has refused to allow states to 
reserve recognition of these fundamental rights.
115
   
A CEJIL lawyer, Roxanna Altholz, observed in an interview that the Court is 
increasingly recognizing impunity and failure to provide justice as distinct human rights 
violations.   Its remedies in the Guatemalan cases are direct attempts to address these 
violations.  IACHR rulings have mandated new and revived prosecutions, and even the 
reinterpretation of amnesty and limitations laws.  Along these lines, Ratner and Abrams 
note generally that “Certain trends in the international legal process suggest these 
somewhat vaguely worded provisions are evolving into obligations by states to take 
specific action against offenders.”
116
  According to these scholars, “Among the most 
significant developments” moving this trend, “was a 1988 decision of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, which interpreted the American Convention of Human Rights to 





The Court also equips victims to seek justice by protecting their safety while they 
are in litigation.  This occurs directly and indirectly.  In the direct approach, litigants can 
ask the IACHR for “provisional measures” if they believe they are in danger or that 
witnesses are being threatened.
118
  The Court will often issue these “provisional 
measures” ordering, for example, the state to provide armed security to litigants.  The 
indirect element of safety that comes from litigating before the IACHR arises as a result 
of the publicity surrounding these cases.  Defendants are less likely to attack or threaten a 
litigant if they are known internationally.  NGOs working within the system foster this.  
Adrianna Beltran, an activist with WOLA coordinated the public relations effort during 
the Mack case.  In an interview, she explained that “when [the Mack family‟s] lawyer 
was receiving a number of threats - right before the case actually went to trial – [Helen] 
called me and said we‟re receiving threats and everybody was on the phone with the state 
department, with the embassy, with members of congress or their staff, saying please call 
and tell them that you‟re really concerned.”
119
  In this effort, Ms. Beltran observed, “we 




C. Condemning Human Rights Violations  
For more than 20 years Guatemala blocked all attempts to punish those 
responsible for the Plan de Sanchez massacre of 268 Mayan Guatemalans (see above).  
Then in 2004, the IACHR ruled that Guatemala was responsible not only for the 
massacre but for denying justice to the victims and families for these many years.  In 
addition to financial compensation, Guatemala was ordered to conduct a public apology.  
On July 18, 2005, exactly 23 years after the massacre, Guatemalan Vice President 
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Eduardo Stein traveled to Plan de Sanchez to formally apologize for the killings before 
the families and survivors of the victims.  In his remarks, Stein conceded that the army 
had “unleashed bloodshed and fire to wipe out an entire community.”
121
  He observed 
that the “people want moments that commemorate their victims, but more than anything, 
they don't want what happened to keep being denied officially.”
122
  
The IACHR recognizes the significance of its rulings as the sole voice of justice 
after years of impunity.  In its judgments, therefore, the IACHR goes beyond traditional 
reparations and includes provisions to amplify the impact of its decisions.  Often this 
takes the form of a mandated, public apology such as the event described above.  In one 
of his first official acts as President, Oscar Berger publicly apologized for the murder of 
Myrna Mack pursuant to an IACHR demand.  President Berger apologized to Myrna 
Mack‟s sister and daughter and to the Guatemalan people in a ceremony broadcast on 
national television and held in front of the military and other dignitaries.     
As the IACHR hearing began in the Carpio case, the president of the Guatemalan 
Human Rights Commission asked to address the Court.  He stood, faced the families of 
the victims, admitted that the state was responsible for the murder of Carpio and his 
associates, and asked for forgiveness.  When each family member testified, counsel for 
the state opened his remarks by apologizing for the state‟s actions.
123
  Soraya Long, the 
CEJIL lawyer representing the families, commented in an interview that “It is extremely 
important that the state has recognized its responsibility – this is a very significant step – 
it is a very important gesture that the state asked for pardon from the victims.”
124
  Ms. 
Long explained “For more than ten years the families of the victims have said the murder 
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of my husband, my father, was political – and the state said no, no … and now finally 
they have said you were right, you were right.” 
 
D. Addressing a Broad Class of Victims with Individual Cases 
A primary critique of the IACHR levied by Posner and Yoo is that the Court 
resolves very few cases.  While this critique certainly has merit and the IACHR would 
have a broader effect if it decided more cases, it is a somewhat misleading measure by 
which to assess this Court.  The IACHR must, after all, preserve its precarious legitimacy 
in a political sea with currents often hostile to judicial review.  If the IACHR were to 
review large numbers of human rights cases, while many national judiciaries in the region 
are struggling, support for the institution would almost certainly be withdrawn.  Instead 
the IACHR, and the parties that litigate in the Inter-American system, seek to make the 
most of the limited resources available to them.  For the most part litigants pursue, and 
the Court decides, cases that reflect a widespread human rights violation or that have 
symbolic importance to the nation and region.   
NGOs operating in the Inter-American system seek out cases and victims whose 
injuries reflect wounds carried by a broader class of victims.  CEJIL represents the 
victims and survivors in most cases heard before the IACHR.  Roxanna Altholz, the 
CEJIL lawyer who served as lead counsel in the Myrna Mack case, explained that the 
organization seeks cases that are “emblematic of a wider set of violations.”
125
  And 
certainly the Myrna Mack case carried this weight.  When Myrna Mack was murdered, on 
September 11, 1990, she was studying the displacement of thousands of indigenous 
Guatemalans.  As an anthropologist with international notoriety, Mack‟s findings were 
 31 
embarrassing to those in power, many of whom were complicit in the disappearances.  
The case, therefore, is symbolic of several of the deepest wounds inflicted during the 30-
year civil war.  Because of Myrna Mack‟s work, the case symbolized the effort to reveal 
the truth about the thousands of Mayan Guatemalans killed during the war.  Also, 
because the state made every effort to block justice in the case, the result was a victory 
over the rampant impunity plaguing Guatemala.  Myrna Mack‟s sister Helen testified 
before the IACHR that the “case is a paradigmatic one not only for her family but also for 
many Guatemalans who see themselves reflected in it” and that by litigating it she was 
“representing, with dignity, the thousands of victims who had no chance.”
126
 
The Plan de Sanchez case clearly had these broad implications.  During the civil 
war the Guatemalan military and civil patrols frequently attacked Mayan villages – 
murdering and disappearing thousands of indigenous Guatemalans.  The Plan de Sanchez 
massacre, therefore, represented one of the most common and most horrific practices of 
the repressive regimes.  As one of the victims testified before the IACHR, “During the 15 
years after the death of our loved ones, there has been repression on the part of the 
authorities in the area – they try to stop us from performing our cultural practices and or 
from celebrating our religious ceremonies.”
127
  Representatives and victims have been 
attempting to hold accountable the powerful figures responsible for these killings for 
more than twenty years.   
Similar cases benefit from the Plan de Sanchez IACHR litigation.  For example 
the Tuluché massacre case involves indigenous villagers who were also labeled as 
subversives during the civil war and were extra-judicially executed.  Attempts to hold 
accountable those who planned and participated in the massacre were repeatedly blocked 
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by the infrastructure of impunity entrenched in the Guatemalan judicial system.
128
  Much 
like Plan de Sanchez, the Tuluché case in Guatemala was plagued by death threats, the 
dismissal of important evidence, as well as arbitrary acquittals of those accused.  The 
results of the Plan de Sanchez case in the IACHR, and other cases like it, have the ability 
to bring justice for Mayans by creating a domino effect of legal accountability for 
thousands accused of similar human rights violations in Guatemala. 
As discussed above the Court required public apologies not only to the victims 
and their families but to the affected communities and the Guatemalan people.  In the 
Plan de Sanchez case the Court further demonstrated the importance of public 
recognition in that it ordered the state to publicize key sections of the Court‟s judgments 
in its official gazette and in a major national newspaper in both Spanish language and 
Achi Maya.
129
  The Court ordered the state to enact efforts to support the growth and 
welfare of the Maya in the Plan de Sanchez Municipality with measures to promote the 
Achi Maya language and Culture.
130
 
The Carpio case had similarly broad implications.  Jorge Carpio Nicolle was 
murdered because of his opposition to an amnesty provision that would have prevented 
legal accountability for thousands accused of human rights violations.  He was a reform 
activist and a journalist who frequently spoke out against the Guatemalan military state 
and efforts to preserve impunity.  His wife, Martha Arrivillaga de Carpio, testified during 
the trial before the IACHR that the Carpio case was “emblematic of the injustice in 
Guatemala.”
131
   
Indeed it was clear that the IACHR realized these implications in handling these 
cases.  Instead of merely awarding reparations the Court frequently requires the state take 
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concrete steps to address the broad class of victims not included in the case.  It sets out to 
attack broad problems through individual cases.  CEJIL lawyer, Soraya Long, argued in 
an interview that “the court uses its judgments to break systemic and structural failings 
and solve the macro problems” facing nations under its jurisdiction.
132
   
In the Carpio case, the Court also assessed remedies designed to address 
weaknesses in Guatemala.  For example, in addition to traditional compensatory damages, 
the Court ordered the state to take concrete steps to prevent similar violations.
133
  In its 
ruling, the Court targeted the widespread, systematic impunity ordering a full 
investigation to identify and punish those responsible for planning and carrying out the 
attack and the subsequent obstruction of justice.
134
  For example, the Court ordered the 
state to remove all “obstacles and mechanisms … that maintain impunity” and to provide 
security for all witnesses, judges and prosecutors.
135
  According to the order all 
information discovered in the investigation must be made public because the victims, 
their families and the Guatemalan people, the Court stressed, have “a right to the 
truth.”
136
  The Court stretched its authority even further and ruled that to the extent 
legislation may have granted the attackers amnesty, it is invalid because such laws violate 
the victims‟ rights to justice and the truth.
137
   
 
 E.  Creating an Historical Record 
  
Recognizing the victims‟ story and enshrining it in the judicial record are essential 
parts of achieving justice for human rights violations.
138
  In these cases, the state denied 
responsibility and obstructed any effort to find the truth.  To the victims, therefore, the 
official recognition of the truth is invaluable.  In its judgment in the Myrna Mack case the 
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IACHR ordered Guatemala to publicize a full account of its violations because “This 
right to the truth … constitutes an important means of reparation.”
139
 
When the Myrna Mack case reached the IACHR, Guatemala offered to accept 
responsibility for the killing but the state was not willing to allow witnesses to testify.
140
  
CEJIL‟s Roxanna Altholz, the lead counsel representing the Mack family, opposed 
Guatemala‟s offer.  In an interview Ms. Altholz stated that they refused Guatemala‟s 
offer because “we didn‟t want a sentence that just recognized responsibility and went on 
to reparations.”
141
   She pointed out that “we wanted, and it was very important for 
[Myrna Mack‟s sister] Helen, to have all these pages of hechos probados [proven 
facts].”
142
  More than that, Ms. Altholz stated, “what was so important for us was to have 
the hechos probados include an indication that the state security forces were responsible 
– that was fundamental for us.”
143
  Not only did the IACHR include in its decision an 
exhaustive account of these hechos probados but it ordered Guatemala to publish them in 
the “official gazette” and another daily newspaper with national circulation.
144
  In all its 
cases CEJIL stresses the importance of allowing the victims and families to tell their 
stories in open court.  Roxanna Altholz pointed out that allowing victims an opportunity 
to create a historical record and to express their suffering is an essential element of 
seeking justice.  She stated that, “the more you can let the victims‟ voices come through 
the better your litigation is – the legal theories ring truer, your case is stronger.”
145
   
This interest can be seen in the Carpio case as well.  Even after Guatemala 
accepted responsibility for the violations, CEJIL lawyers encouraged their witnesses – the 
families of the victims – to testify extensively on their experiences, their suffering, and 




  They asked the court to set out an official version of the truth 
by determining the specific acts and omissions that amounted to violations of the 
Convention and by assigning institutional responsibility.
147
  The representative of the 
state did not object to allowing this testimony, “recognize[ing] the right of the victims to 
testify and tell their truth.”
148
  The victims‟ counsel, Soraya Long, pointed out in an 
interview that for “the Carpio family … it was very significant to come here to [the Inter-
American Court] because with the internal proceeding they felt thwarted… and to come 
to this court and say what occurred, to establish a record and to demonstrate that they had 
overcome.”
149
   
Never has the importance of creating an historical record been more evident than 
in the Plan de Sanchez case.  The IACHR recognized the injury inflicted by the state‟s 
repeated denials and obstruction.  It held that “the impunity in this case keeps the 
memory of these acts fresh and impedes social reconciliation.”
150
  An expert on the rights 
of indigenous peoples, Augusto Willemsen-Diaz, testified that “[t]o end the 
discrimination and racism of the indigenous people in Guatemala I recommend that the 
most important things are the acknowledgment of what occurred and that the people take 
notice of the enormous amount of abuses that have occurred.”
151
  The anguish in the 
victims‟ stories was memorialized in the Court‟s opinion.  In the testimony of a family 
member, Juan Manuel Jerónimo he says “the following day the bodies of our loved ones 
were still decomposing when the military commissioners from Chipuerta arrived… They 
did the most savage of burials and we were no longer able to recognize our relatives.”
152
   
The decision also included testimony regarding the impunity entrenched in the 
Guatemalan legal system.  Another family member, Buenaventura Manuel Jerónimo, 
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stated that “the violence, the corruption, and the discrimination against the Indigenous 
peoples and farmers impeded justice.”  He continued, “Until this day there are threats 
against the judges” who hear these cases against the state.”
153
    Through this testimony in 
front of the IACHR Guatemala‟s violent past and present were finally given a voice.   
The IACHR is effective in setting out these histories.  In its decisions the hechos 
probados sections are extensive memorializing the victims‟ stories, the violations and the 
impunity. For example, in the Carpio case, the IACHR including an account of Mr. 
Carpio‟s work for Guatemalan democracy through his government service, political 
activism and leadership of the newspaper “El Grafico.”
154
  CEJIL‟s Soraya Long stressed 
the importance of establishing a historical record.  She commented in an interview that 
“Carpio‟s work exists in the fabric of Guatemala – in acts of the assembly, in articles of 
the constitution – his family demands that their father – their husband – be included in the 





5. Conclusions – Impact of the Inter-American Court 
 
Our analysis demonstrates that the Inter-American Court is a valuable factor 
promoting human rights accountability and reconciliation in Latin America.  (See Table 
1).  It is a powerful voice of accountability in a region struggling to fully democratize.  
By holding states accountable it demonstrates to citizens that overcoming impunity is 
possible.  The Court‟s jurisprudence thus, to use Teitel‟s language, “evinces the clear 
delimiting of state power on the basis of individual rights norms.”
156
  Lawyers, judges 
and activists then seek human rights protections in domestic institutions armed with the 
principles of law established by the Court.  This positive impact is accentuated when the 
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activists pursue, and the Court hears, cases that are emblematic of broader human rights 
problems.  Finally, in each case the Court enshrines the victims‟ stories of suffering into 
an historical record.  After years of official denial, the Inter-American Court represents 
an official acceptance of the truth.    
There are several critiques that may be levied at the Inter-American system.  
Posner and Yoo correctly point out that the IACHR hears very few cases and that 
compliance rates are questionable.
157
  Rescia and Seitles argue that the delay in 
processing cases, along with procedural deficiencies and normative problems, are 
significant failings of the system.
158
  One can see support for this in the Carpio case – 
which was filed in 1994 and resolved in 2004.  Indeed these critiques have some merit 
and this essay is not intended to refute them.  On the contrary, we conclude that even 
with these weaknesses the IACHR is still indispensable in aiding reconciliation and 
democratization for the post-conflict democracies in Latin America.  The system would 
be even more effective if it addressed many of the concerns voiced by critics.   
In post-conflict democracies, domestic courts struggle for legitimacy, resources 
and a meaningful role in their state‟s political discourse.  However, as arms of the state 
they often share the state‟s interest in quieting efforts to uncover past atrocities.  
Moreover, they are frequently subject to influence from the other political powers.
159
  
When litigants are able to reach beyond the state for justice, they escape this institutional 
deck heavily stacked against them.   
Human rights observers often note the effect of the IACHR‟s work.  For example, 
in its 2005 Report, Human Rights Watch observed that the “Inter-American human rights 
system has provided an important venue for human rights advocates seeking to press the 
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state to accept responsibility for abuses.”
160
  Similarly, after the Carpio, Mack and Plan 
de Sanchez cases, Amnesty International recognized that, although Guatemala is still 
suffering serious human rights violations, it has achieved  “minor progress in trying past 
cases of genocide or crimes against humanity.”
161
  Moreover, Amnesty International 
pointed out that after these cases the Berger administration “took some positive measures 
including modernization of the army and establishing a National Reparations 
Commission.”
162
   Similar effects can be seen in other nations appearing before the Court.  
For example, Helio Bicudo credits the Court‟s rulings with helping Peru restore 




During the Carpio hearing, Silvia Villacorta, the wife of one of the victims, told 
the Court that “in Guatemala there is no justice so we must look to international justice.”  
“We want,” she told the judges, “a precedent that future generations can look to.”
164
  
While the institutions and procedures of the Inter-American Court need strengthening, it 
is a positive – and necessary – force for human rights accountability on the region.  It 




Table 1 Standard for Assessing the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
Purpose of International Court 
 
Source Contribution of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights 
Facilitating Accountability – Equipping 




 Circumventing institutional barriers to 
accountability 
 Innovating international human rights law 
 Protecting litigants, victims and witnesses 







 Holding states accountable for violations 
 Communicating societal condemnation of the 
violations. 
 Upholding the rule of law 
Addressing a Broad Class of Victims 




 Hearing cases that are emblematic of 
widespread violations. 
 Tailoring remedies to address systemic 
problems 
 Issuing sanctions to aid broad class of victims 
 
Establishing an Historical Record Teitel 
Minow 
Ratner and Abrams 
 Allowing victims to testify often for the first 
time 
 Recording events based on evidence 
 Overcoming state denials and obfuscations 
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